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I.

Introductio n
a'i\" Definitiona l and Measurement Problems
Before explaining the importance of national savings for developing countries

and the manner in which the subject matter will be treated in this paper, one should
first define financial intermediat ion and national savings.

Financial intermediat ion

is the act of collecting savings (and perhaps other funds) by financial institution s
and the rechannellin g of these funds to borrowers for financing investments .

There

are financial institution s in both the organized and unorganized sectcrs of money and
capital markets in developing countries.

For the p:irpose of this study, however,

we shall limit the analysis to the role of financial intermediat ion in promoting
savings in the organized markets.

We do not deny the importtmce of financial insti

tutions in unorganized markets but for them, the availabilit y of data is less and,
furthermore , the i.nstitution s in the unorganized sector are not always financial
intermediar ies.

For example, .pawnshoos
. and mane~,
- .. ., lenders can be considered as
-

financial institutions because they lend money, but they <lo not act as intermediar ies
since they usually do not col1.ect savings or borrow from other sources to finance
the:tr· operations.

However, finan.~ial intermed:i.at. ion i.n the unorganized sector exists

____ _______________ __

in some countries such as India and Burma (main.ly prewar) where special types of
_,,_,

,

1../In the preparation of this paper, I have benefitted from discussions with
a number: of my colleagues at the internation al Monetary Fund and at Yale University.
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indigencua..bar:.ker.s--a-ccept deposits from friends and customers.

There may also

be some financial intermediation when professional people such as notaries, la_wyers,
soliciters or doctors, accept money for safe keeping or for investment on behalf of
clients, and relend these fundsJ e.g. in the Philippines, Congo (Kinshasa), and in
some Latin American countries.
Since this study is limited to financial institutions in organized markets,
a comparison be::·ween countries may not reveal the total effect of intermediation
on savings.

However, intra-countries comparisons would be valid.

The coverage of

financial institutions in the organized sector, includes not only the institutions
which one commonly thinks of namely the central bank and the commercial banks, but
also development banks, savings banks, and speicalized institutions such as co
operative societies and post office savings banks.

For some countries, operations

of the government, :i.nsofar as the Treasury accepts deposits, should also be included.
But ,;.:re hav.e been unable to do this because of lack of comparable data for time
series analysis.
Although one is tempted to define savings by residents orr.ationals of the
country as dom0.stic savings, :i.t would be better to call them national savings, to
be consistent with the system of national income accounts.

Developing countries

receive financial assistance from abroad to finance domestic investment, i.e.
investment m.:::.de within the geographic boundaries of a develop:i.ng country.

Therefore,

in o::der to maintain the identity between savings and domestic investment, total
savings should je def:i.ned as the sum of national savings plus savings from abroad.
Local or national savings can then be defined as the difference between income and
consumption as recorci€d in national income accounts.

- 3 -

Even if one can define clearly what one means by national savings, there are
difficult problems of measurement.

Data on government savings are usually_ reliable,

even though some countries such as the United States do not publish official data on
government sector savings.

Some economists would argue that the division of govern•

ment expenditures into current and capital is rather arbitrary, especially, if the
classification is. meant to measure government's development effort.

They would

argue that some current expenditures, such as those for education and maintenance
of hospitals and roads, all help to increase output.

If such expenditures for

development are excluded from current government expenditures, then one would arrive
at figures of government saving much larger than what is normally published in
national income accounts.
But a more important question than the measurement of government sector
savings is that of measuring the savings of the private sector.

Data for these

are normally derived as a residue from the components of Gross National Expenditure
and the identity between the excess of savings over investment and the current

account surplus in the balance of payments.

The fact that private savings data

in national income accounts are not reliable has been commented upon by many
economists.

It has been noted that private savings derived from changes in

financial assets of the private sector with financial institutions have been larger
at times than private savings, exclusive of depreciation, as recorded in national
accounts.

Thus, for example, savings of households in Panama have been recorded as

negative for all the postwar years even though their financial assets such as money
d l/
.
.
accounts h ave increase.and savings

lilt was Professor Goldsmith who first drew my attention to such anomalies.

- 4 -

those in natio nal incom e
At times , data from field surve ys have been bette r than
that, ''A field surve y on
accou nts. Thus, for the Philip pines it has been said
Stati stica l Surve y of
consu mer incom e·4Ud expen diture s, known as the Philip pine
Coun cil, estim ated house 
House holds (PSSH) and condu cted by the Natio nal Economic
1957; this contr asts
hold savin g at 737 milli on pesos for the year ended March
shown in the natio nal incom e
with the negat ive perso nal savin gs of 82 milli on pesos
appea rs to under state both
accou nts for the calen dar year 1956. Altho ugh, the PSSH
bette r estim ate of house hold
house hold income and expen diture s, it proba bly gives a
mic Coun cil.,,! / As a
savin gs than the resid ual estim ates of the Natio nal Econo
te savin gs are likely to
gener al rule, one can say that estim ates of total priva
savin gs and perso nal savin gs.
be less unrel iable than the divis ion betwe en corpo rate
of how much of the
In addit on to the proble m of measu remen t is the quest ion
t, if one were to redef ine
recor ded natio nal savin gs is the resul t of natio nal effor
Here, we are not raisin g
this in terms of savin gs by natio nals of the count ry.
enabl es natio nal savin gs to
the quest ion of wheth er addit ional foreig n assist ance
inves tment leadin g to a
rise more rapid ly becau se such assist ance finan ces more
more rapid rate of growt h.

The quest ion is a limite d one of distin guish ing betwe en

busin esses opera ting with
savin gs by citize ns and savin gs by foreig n natio nals and
ed for balan ce of payme nts
in a count ry, i.e. foreig ners who are conve ntion ally defin
ry.
and natio nal accou nts stati stics as resid ents of the count

To the exten t that

re of a devel oping count ry,
such foreig n natio nals and busin ess are a perma nent featu
althou gh there may be
there is no econo mic proble m in includ ing their savin gs,
Insti tute of
i/Ric hard W. Hoole y, Savin gs in the Philip pines 1951- 1960,
pines (Quezon City,
Economic Devel opmen t and Resea rch, Unive rsity of the Philip
1963) . pp. 1-2.

- 5 -

sociologi cal problems.

In fact, one could safely project the trend of such savings

to continue as before.

However, since governmen ts of an increasin g number of

developin g countries are nationali zing foreign investmen ts, it may not be desirable
to include these savings in national savings, especiall y as experienc e has shown
that the profits, and consequen tly savings, of nationali zed enterpris es tend to
decline, at least during the first few years after nationali zation.

Furthermo re,

in the past foreign investors have had more scope and opportun ity to transfer
savings abroad than nationall y owned savings, with attended effects upon domestic
wealth.
There is also another problem in the measureme nt of national savings,
even if one decides to include savings of domiciled foreign enterpris es in the
definitio n of national savings.

This arises because the identity I-S = M-X

(where I is investmen t, Sis national savings, Mis imports of goods and services,
and Xis exports of goods and services) , does not mean that the import surplus is
necessari ly equal to the net inflow of capital from abroad.

A country may have

decided to utilize some of its accumulat ed foreign exchange
domestic investmen ts (or even to enlarge its consumpti on) and therefore , M-X =
Kf + Af' where Kf is the net inflow of capital from abroad and Af is the use of
foreign assets or reserves owned by the country.

For such cases the actual savings

would be smaller than that recorded in the national income accounts by the amount

b. The Need to Increase National Savings
It is clear that the level of savings and investmen t is only one of the
many ingredien ts which determine s the rate of economic growth in developin g countries .
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There may be excess capacity in the industrial sector not because of a lack of
effective demand, but because the industrial project was not sound and there aren't
sufficient skilled workers to operate the factory or because the products are not
competitive with imported products.

There may be excess hydroelectr ic capacity

or extra capacity in the transport sector because it is necessary to have lumpy
Or the equipment in all sectors, whether in the form of tractors

investments .

or trucks, may not be utilized efficiently as it takes time for the learning process
to take root.

All this means is that capital investment made in the past have either

a shorter life span than orginally envisaged or may yield a smaller output.
The need to exercise caution in using investment- savings growth models
of the Hartod Domar type has been mentioned by Professor Albert D. Hirschman who
inter-alia said,
Now, there is no harm in making these computation s •••
But if one thinks that the functional relationshi ps assumed
in the model are a meaningful description of the development
process, a point may be reached at which the-model becomes
a hindrance rather than a help in the understandin g of the
reality of underdevelo ped countries ••• Moreover, "normal"
productivit y is often held back by shortages and bottle
necks and where their elimination may suddenly produce a
considerabl e increase in the productivit y of already
invested capital.":.!/
11

Professor Hla Myint, in questioning the relevance of Professor W.W. Rostow's
thesis of take off into self-sustain ed growth for developing countries has.
stated, "without entering at this stage into the assumptions behind the advice
to save and invest more than 10 percent of national income, it is worth noting
!/Albert D. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale University
Press, 1958) paper bound, p. 32.

- 7 that a country's rate of economic growth depends not only on how much it can save,but
also on how productively it can invest thin saving •••

This seems to depend on

a complex of less easily measurable qualitative factors such as the skills and
attitudes of its people, or the efficiency and flexibility of its economic organ
ization••• ,,l/
Professor W. Arthur Lewis in emphasizing the need to accumulate capital
from domestic sources has stated, "the central problem in the theory of economic
growth is to understand the process by which a community is converted from being
a 5 percent to a 12 percent saver--with all the changes in attitudes, in institutions
and in techniques which accompany this conversion.~•£/
From the above quotes it can be seen that it is a matter of which aspect
of the determinants of growth one wishes to emphasize.

While it is true that

savings and investments do not by themselves bring about economic growth there
is no denying that national savings are a necessary condition for financing domestic
investment.

National savings are a necessary condition for investment because there

are limits to the amount of official foreign aid and private capital which can be
secured from abroad.

In fact, despite the general exhortations and recommendations

made in various international reports such as those by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and recently by the Pearson Commission report

!/Hla Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries, (Frederick A. Praeger,
New York 1965) pp. 15, 16.

£1w. ~rthur Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth (Harper and Row, paper edition,
1970), pp. 224, 225.

where it recol1.llilends

11

that each industrialized country increase its resource trans

fers to low-incone countries to a mininun of 1 percent of its GNP as rapidly as
possible and in no case later than 1975a!/, it.is doubtful that developing countries
will get as much aid as recommended.
in money values only.

Undoubtedly more aid will be forthcoming but

If account were to be taken for price increases, the real

quantum of aid will rise less rapidly and even the target of 1 percent in relation
to the GNP of developed countries is unlikely to be reached for some of the more
important aid donors such as the United States.
On the other hand~ even if aid were to equal 1 percent of the GNP of the
industrialized countries there would still Le a resource gap as LDCs have to keep
raising their investment targets to narrow the gap in the standards of living
between them and the developed countries.

Therefore, national savings are needed

if domestic investnent is to be financed without much inflation and without large
balance of paynents deficits.

Structuralists would probably argue that there is

no need to have internal and external bnlance and that to limit the level of
investment to the anount of voluntary savings would mean a growth rate much lower
than the politically accepta)le level.

They would arroue that since savings are

not sufficient; it would be nec.2RR~ry to have inflation as a means of reallocating

resources frora consuners to investors and, by a price increase, bring about a
higher rate of

11

forcec1:' savings.

ly with noney-illusion ,
itself tends to fall.

This night be possihle in the short run, especial

But in the longer run, the level of

11

forced savings"

The arguoents against financing development through in

flation have been given in many articles in Staff Papers and elsewhere and need
not concern us here.±/
-1/ Report of the Lester I,, Pearson Comm.ission on International Development,
Partners in Developoent (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969) p. 147.
]:./For exanples, see E. ri. i3ernstein and I. G. Patel, ninflation in Relation
11
to Economic Development, Staff Papers, Novemter 1952; U Tun Wni, The Relation
1
between Inflation and Econonic Levelopnent \ Staff Papers, October 1959; A. S.
Shaalan, 1 'The Inpact of Inflation on the Conposition of Private Dones tic Investment",
Staff Papers, July 1962, and Graeme S. Donance, iiinflation and Growth", Staff Papers,
March 1966.
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Another approach which implies a leoaening of the need for national savings
is that of neo-Keynesians to development problems.!/

They would argue that un

employed labor and land in developing countries enables investment to be financed
by credit expansion which would cauoe output to expand, thus bringing about an ex
poste identity of savings and investment without inflation and balance of payment
deficits.

Our

view, however, is closer to that of Professor V.K.R.V. Rao who has

said,

'~part from the difficulties caused by the ~resence of
diguised unemployment, the agrarian nature of the· economy makes
for a supply curve that, at best, is much more unelastic than ---
that of an industrialized economy such as Keynes primarily had
in mind when formulating his theory of employment ••• Savings
[in real terms], therefore, fail to rise to equality with
investment; and with deficit financing, the inflationary process
sets in earlier and proceeds faster in an agrarian or under•
developed economy as compared with an industrialized or
developed economy.'!~/
The availability of surplus labour could also mean that one does not need
to increase national savings before embarking on a development program.

Professor

W. Arthur Lewis in his path breaking article has said,
"In

"U1" r.irirlr->1,

i f c,nrplnc, 1tihm,r

is put to

r.<ipit-::il

fn-rmtif"inn

and paid out of new money, prices rise, because the stream of
money purchases ic swollen while the output of consumer goods is
for the time being constant ••• And, of course, as soon as the
capital goods begin to yield output, consumption begins to rise.
The inflationary process does not go on for ever; it comes to an
end when voluntary savings increase to a level where they are
equal to the inflated level of investment.•1/

l/see for example Ashok Mathur, "On Throwing the Baby Away with the Bathwater-
An Essay in the Defense of Keynesian in Relation to the Underdeveloped Countries",
Indian Economic Journal, April-June 1965 pp. 397-416.
1/v.K.R.V. Rao, "Investment, Income and the Multiplier in an Underdeveloped
Economy", in The Indian Economic Review, February 1952. Reprinted in A. N. Agarwala
and S. P. Singh, The Economies of Underdevelopment, (Oxford University Press, 1958).
1/w. Arthur Lewis_, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour"
in The Manchester School, May 1954. Reprinted in A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh,
The Economies of Underdevelopment, (Oxford University Press 1958).
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While it is true that trying to finance investments by bank credit is
less inflationary in an economy with unlimited supplies of labour than in a
fully employed economy, there is still the problem that the existing labour
supply may not be useable further expenditures on education.

The needed land

may have to be cleared and finally even small agricultural implements would
have to be imported before a stream of food or other agricultural goods can be
forthcoming.

This could raean a serious balance of payments problem or immediate

reduction in consumer imports to make room for capital imports.
there is need to increase national savings.

In other words,

Professor Nurkse in discussing the

saving potential concealed in rural underemployment has cited a number of problems
~hich arise in drawing e:ccess workers off existing farms to work on new investment
~rejects, namely 1) to prevent peasants remaining on the farms from eating more
2) to be certain that decline in farm output does not occur when surplus labor is
withdrawn 3) Possibility that the surplus labour working in industry may consume
more than on the farms 4) possible leakage through the cost of transporting the
food from the farms to places where the capital projects are established, and
1 /

5) the need to give tools to the new investment workers •.:!:/ His conclusion is
probably valid for some of the developing countries, i.e.
"Here we have a relationship between consumption and investment
which stands midway between the classical and the Keynesian
approach. In the class~cal model, an increase in the rate of
capital formation requires a reduction in consumption. In the
Keynesian world of industrial unemployment, consumption as well
as investment can be expanded at the same time."1/

1/
- See Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries
(Oxford University Press, 1967) pp. 36~44.

1/ Ibid. ,

p. 38 •
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But if one were to ask about the position of the majority of developing
countries, without unlimited supplies of labour, one would have to conclude
that the classical model would be more applicable.
Even for the model with unlimited supplies of labour, Professor Lewis does
not advocate continuous financing of investments by bank credit.

He says that

"It is not, therefore, enough that savings should increase to this
extent [equal to the increased investment expenditure] for if these
savings are used for additional investment the initial gap still
remains. The gap is closed only if savings are hoarded, or used to
buy government bonds, so that the government can now finance its
investments by borrowing, instead of by creating new money."]:/
Finally, if there are still lingering doubts about the need to increase
national savings in developing countries, all one needs to do on a pragmatic level
is to study the developments plans.

Every development plan of a developing country

has an unfilled gap between projected investments and the amount of available
foreign finance and national savings.

To be sure, some of this gap may be

fictitious by the inclusion of projects which are not yet ready for execution
or because the LDCs are using the plan to seek more foreign aid.

On the other

hand, since the estimates of national savingG are usually highly nprimi.~t'.i.r. 1 t:he

projected gap may be fairly realistic.

In some plans, for example in the Kenya

Development Plan, 1970-74, the table on the total supply and use of resources
does not show a projected gap only because both the inflow of foreign capital
(or the projected import surplus of goods and services) and the national savings

21
.
d to give
.
equa 1·i ty.have been so estimate

1
Aspans
go, t he "~enya estimate o f a

rise in national savings from an average of 16.8 percent of GNP in 1967 and 1968

1/w. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor",
11

The Manchester School, May 1964.
'l:_/ See Kenya Development Pl§.E:, 1970-74, (Nairobi, 1969), Table 5.8, p. 159.
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to 19.8 percent of GNP in 1974 is not unrealistic considering that the 1964-1965
average was 14.9 percent.

However, it is clear that there is a gap and ttr. Mwai

Kibaki, the Governor of the Fund and Bank for Kenya stated at the last Annual
Meeting of the Board of Governors of the IMF that,
" ••• in order to implement our new and enlarged Development Plan it is
necessary for us to borrow more substantial amounts from outside the
country in order to cove:c the inevitable foreign exchange gap. 111/
A recent study by Raul Prebi.sch on Latin American countries has stressed
the need to raise the coefficient of dor:1estic saving from 18. 3 percent in
1966-68 to 26.5 percent in 1.980 iu order to attain a rate of development of 8
percent by the latter year, which he consideriJ necessary to absorb most of the
to prevent unemployment.1/ He arrives at these
increases in manpower and
percentages despite the fact that his projections of net inflow of capital are
based on assumptions that developed countries would increase their aid to 1
percent of GNP level, that Lat in American countries will get the same share of
this aid as before, and that the existing debt burden would be stretched out on
two alternative paths of a 4 percent amortization with 2 percent rate of interest
or a 4 percent amortization with a 6 percent rate of interest.
c. Outline and Objectives of Paper
Although the main interest of the paper is the influence of financial
intermediation on national savings, we do not claim that this is the only factor

1/ International "Mone.tary Fund, .~mary Proceeding~ of the Twenty-Fifth
Annual Meeting of the Board--2l.__Governors, September 1970J Po 140.
1/Raul Prebisch, Chang~- and Development-Lat_in America' ~Great Task, A
report submitted to the Inter•·American Development Bank (Washington D.C.,
3uly 1970) p. 109.

- 13 nor that there is a unique relation between the extent of financial intermediat ion
and the level of national savings.

Our interest in this subject has arisen because

many developing countries are pushing ahead with the establishme nt of financial
intermediar ies.

The development of financial institution s is considered by many

governments to be a prerequisit e in their effort to collect national savings.

It

will be recalled that in the early fifties, the United Nations ECAFE held a
number of conferences on the mobilizatio n of domestic capital with emphasis on
developing financial institution s.
There are both economic and non-economi c determinant s of savings.

Many

theories of savings have been developed by economists and a brief review of their
relevance to developing countries is given in the next section.

However, many of

the existing theories of savings do not lend themselves to policy mainpulatio n.
On the other hand, the establishme nt of new institution s as well as correct
interest rate and proper monetary and fiscal policies can lead to a larger amount
of national savings within one or two plan periods of four to five years.
In attempting to get at the truth of the determinant s of savings in
developing countries, we are probably faced with describing an elephant in a
like manner as the six blind men of Hindustan, each of whom upon feeling the
elephant had a different view.

One said that the elephant was a wall having

felt its sides, the second said it was similar to a tree trunk having felt its
legs, the third said it was like a fan having felt its ears, the fourth said it
was like a spear having felt its tusks, the fifth said that it was like a snake
having felt its trunk, and the last said it was like a rope·having felt its tail.
Therefore, in the third section, we have outlined some ideas toward integrating
existing theories of savings.
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The fourth section is devoted to a statistical comparision of the evolution
of national savings between countries and also for the same countries over time.
Although all possible determinant s are not listed we attempt to see what possible
differences in economic structure, financial policies, or availabilit y of foreign
assistance, role of government, etc. could justify diverging trends.
does the rate of inflation act as a deterrent to savings?

For example,

Do higher interest

rates lead to higher savings rates?
The fifth section deals with the major financi.al institution s which exist
in most developing countries and the role which each of them plays in collecting
savings.

Some of the questions tackled are the kinds of policies and measures

which have been used to increase national savings.,
The sixth section attempts to determine in simplified econometric models
whether there is a positive influence of financial intermediat ion on national
savings.

The proxy variable used for financial intermediat ion is the increase in

financial claims of the private sector (i.e. of businesses and households) on
other domestic sectors namely financial institution s and central government,
while national savings data are derived from national income accounts.

This section

uses other variables such as prices, interest rates and trend besides the financial
intermediat ion proxy.
Most of the correlation s are on an intra-count ry time-series basis with only
a few intercountr y comparisons ,

Although a comparative study is important for a

better understandi ng ef the differences between countries, government are likeJ."
to be less influenced by conclusions from cross-secti on country data than lesson~
learned from their own experience or that of a country similar to theirs.

- 15 The paper has a summary and conclusions section to determine what financial
policy guidelines can be developed from the study especially with reference to
conditions under which high marginal saving ratios can be assumed by LDCs in the
preparation of development plans.

Following the various studies on finance by

Professors Goldsmith, Gurley, and Shaw~ it is now generally accepted that financial
intermediation does matter in economic development.

The difficult question is not

whether it matters but the extent to which changes in financial intermediation can
increase savings and development effort.

Apart from the collection of savings, the

traditional view is that financial intermediation makes for a more efficient al
location of funds for investment on the assumption that savings get channelled to
In

more efficient entrepreneurs and managers, for financing their investments.
this paper, we are more interested in the collection of savings than in the
allocative aspect of financial intermediation,
II.

Relevance of Existing Theori~s~avi ngs for LDCs
In the economic literature, there are at least two broad views about the

determinants of national savings.

One view stems from the classical and neo

classical schools which stress interest or the rate of return on savings, and
the other from Keynes and other modern economists such as Franco Modigliani
and Milton Friedman who stress income.
a. Interest Rate Theories
According to the classical economists, savings is the payment of abstaining
from consumption, a reward for waiting, or payment for the use of funds, etc.
Therefore, a higher rate of interest will increase the amount of savings.

On the

other hand the demand for funds is decided by the need to finance investments.
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Interest rate is determined by the equilibrium point between savings and investment.
Alfred Marshall cited both economic and non-economic factors as influencing
savings.

Among the economic factors, a key role is given to interest, though

there may be some saving even if interest were negative,

To quote him:

11

We may therefore call interest the reward for waiting: not of
abstinence ••• The greater the rate of gain from present sacrifice
the greater will be the saving, but not alwayso So the higher the
rate of interest the greater the savings as a rule, but there are
exceptions to the rule.•1/

Knut Wicksell, though mentioning that savings depended on a number of
complex motives, said, ''Among the many influences affecting the accumulation
of capital, the rate of interest is undoubtedly one,"-although even its influence
is uncertain and ambiguous.

Theoretically, the iadividual should always carry

his accumulation of capital (or it may be his consumption of capital) to the
point at which the present and future marginal utilities of the goods saved
is equal. ,,J,./
Irving Fisher said that the rate of interest is determined by six sets
of equations or conditions, namely two opportunity principles (which represent
investment opportunities), two impatience principles, and two market principles
(supply and demand for funds and the market has to be cleared and debtors paid
off).

He gave many social and non-economic factors as affecting savings besides

interest rateso

To quo:.:e h:i.m:

.!~lfred Marshall, Princip~es of Econom~. (.Tl!-ir-<l• Edition, Macmillan and .
'Ootnp:aey:,_~1895) pp. 313., 315, 316.

:p..,J
' •· -·
,,
'. ••
·-;- Knut Wicksel1,
Lectures on Political
Economy ··- Volume I General Theory
Translated from Swedish by E. Classen (The Macmillan Co. New York 1935).

- 17 " ••• it is clear that the rate of interest is dependent
upon very unstable influences, many of which have their j
origin deep down in the social fabric and involve
considerations not strictly economic. Any causes tending
to affect intelligence, foresight, self control, habits,
longevity of man, family affection, and fashion will have
their influence upon the rate of interest.'~/
The relevant question for this paper is whether the level of the interest
rate or changes in interest can affect the amount of national savings in LDCs,
other things remaining unchanged.

The role of interest rates in tl':e organized

and unorganized money markets has been described by me in two articles prepared
more than a decade ago.11 while those articles did not touch upon the question of
whether changes in interest rates tend to increase national savings, it was made
clear that the demand and supply of loanable funds in LDCs were influenced by
interest rates, though not necessarily in the exact manner as in the developed
countries.

To the extent that a supply of funds is similar to a supply of savings,

one may conclude prima facie that since the supply of funds is influenced by
interest rates, the supply of savings must also be influenced by interest rates.
There are at least five possibilities why changes in real interest rates
(at constant prices) may not cause the supply of national savings to increase in
LDC's.

The first reason would be, if the existing market rate of interest is below

the equilibrium level because of credit rationing.

This is highly plausible for

the organized markets of LDCs because there are many countries where interest rates
are at or even below levels prevailing in the developed countries, e.g. French

l 1rrving

Fisher, The Theory of Interest--As Determined by Impatience to Spend
Income and Opportunity to Invest it (Kelley and Millman, Inc" New York 1954) p. 505.
1/see U Tun Wai, "Interest Rates in the Organized Money Markets of Under.;.
developed Countries" in Staff Papers 1 August 1956 and "Interest Rt1tes Outside the
Organized Money Markets of Underdeveloped Countries" in Staff Papers, November
1957. Although the statistics are now out of date, the broad conclusions appear
to be still valid.
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speaking countries in Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, India, Pakistan, Honduras, etc.
Undoubtedly, in these countries more credit rationing is practiced by commercial
banks in these countries than in the developed countries.

Secondly, if the

changes in interest rate are extremely small, savings may not increase because
people are insensitive to small changes"

Thirdly, even if the amount of the

change in interest is large, people with very low incomes may not be able to
save.

The fou~th reason could be the existence of a backward sloping supply

curve of savings, i.e, if the income effect from higher rates outweighs the
substitution. effect.

This is probably not applicable to LDCs bec'ause income from

interest has not yet reached such a high level as to cause loanable funds to
decline with higher rates of interest,

A fifth possibility is that interest rate

does not play a role in LDCs because of social or religious reasons.

However, this

is a false argument because in fact people in LDCs are also motivated by economic
reasons,

For example, interest continues to be ·charged in Muslim countries in the

organized markets and, in the unorganized markets, the lender receives other favours
from the borrower in lieu of interest.

Close family ties may mean that loans are

given without charging interest, but this is probably not of any great statistical
importance in LDCs.
b. Keynesian Theory
That the amount of savings is dependent on the level of income was hinted
at by Adam Smith as can be seen from the following quotez
When the stock which a man possesses is not more than sufficient to
maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of
deriving any revenue from it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can
and endeavours by his labour to acquire something which may supply
its place before it be consumed altogether. This is the state of
the great part of the labouring poor in all countrieso
11

- 19 But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for
months or years, he naturally endeavors to derive a revenue from
the greater part of it ••• His whole stock, therefore, is distin
guished into two parts. That part which, he expects, is to
afford him this revenue is called capital. The other is that
which supplies his immediate consumption ••• •'1./
However, it was John Maynard Keynes, who explicitly related savings to income
through his psychological propensity to consume.

Since savings are the residue

from income less consumption and as consumption was supposed to increase less
rapidly than income, it follows that savings should rise more than proportionate•

ly with income.

Keynes listed eight main motives or objects of a subjective

character which lead individuals to refrain from spending out of their incomes,
namely Precaution, Foresight, ~alculation, Improvement, Independence, Enterprise,

Pride, and Avarice.

He also listed four factors, Enterprise, Liquidity, Improve

ment, Prudence which motivate governments to save.

But for the argument of his

book, he takes as given the main background of subjective motives to saving and
2/
.
. 1y.respective
t o consumption,

According to Keynes, an increase in the rate of interest (assuming no
change in the demand-schedule for investment) would cause the total amount actually
saved to decrease even if the rise in interest causes the community to save more
out of a given income.
than investment.

This occurs because incomes would fall by a greater amount

To quote from his book regarding the difference in approach with

the classical school, he said,

l/Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book II, Chapter I on "Of the Division
of stock." (The Modern Library Edition, Random House, 1937) p. 262.

2/

- John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(Harcourt, Brace and World, Ince, paperback edition 1965) pp. 107-llO.
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•~11 these points of agreement can be summed up in a proposition
which the classical school would accept and I should not dispute;
namely, that if the level of income is assumed to be given, we
can infer that the current rate of interest must lie at the point
where the demand curve for capital corresponding to different
rates of interest cuts the curve of the amounts saved out of the
given income corresponding to different rates of interest.

But this is the point at which definite error creeps into
the classical theory. If the classical school merely inferred
from the above propositin that; given the demand curve for
capital and the influence of changes in the ~ate of interest
on the readiness to save out of given incomes, the level of
income and the rate of interest must be uniquely correlated,
there would be nothing to quarrel withe Horeover, this propo
sition would lead naturally to another proposition which
embodies an important truth; namely that, if the rate of
interest is given as well as the demand curve for capital and
the influence of the rate of interest on the readiness to
save out of given levels of incorae,the level of income must
be the factor which brings he amount saved to equality
with the amount invested.'!.::..

17

The Keynesian system, however, was developed for an industrial economy and
not for an underdeveloped country.

For the systen to work, the 8 e has to be both

unemployed capital and labor and all the other complementary factors of production.
In an underdeveloped country there may be unemployed labour but not unemployed
capital.

Therefore, there is no question of having excessive savings and not

enough effective demando

The model which fits the LDC's is the classical rather

than the Keynesian model.

With a large foreign trade sector, the adjustment in

LDCs to interest rate policies and government deficit financing takes place
through changes in the balance of payments rather than in changes in the real

1/John Maynard Keynes, ]bid., pp. 178-179.

~
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level of income.
Keynes conceded that a higher saving rate was needed for growth in full
employme nt.

As he said,

For we have seen that, up to the point where full employment
prevails, the growth of capital depends not at all on a low
propensit y to consume but is, on the contrary, held back by
l/
it; and only in condition s of full employment is a low
1
'
capital.
of
growth
the
to
cond~cive
propensit y to consume
11

We can reinterpr et this for the LDCs by saying that although there is
unemployment of labourJ there is full employment of capital.
are needed to create capital.

And that savings

Furthermo re, skilled labour is usually fully

employed in LDCs. ·
c. Other Theories
In the early yea~s, after Keynesian economics took hold, inductive tests
found high correlatio ns between consumpti on and incomeo

In later years, as the

results were less good, other variants of the influence of income on savings were
developed •. For example, Milton Friedman tried to establish the consumpti on
function not in relation to current income but:fn relation to some concept of a
permanent income.

Others such as Modiglian i, have emphasize d that consumpti on is

based on ones own life cycle income.

In other words, savings occur only to even

out temporary changes in income.
Both hypothese s are very persuasiv e.

Even though it is difficult to

1
know what the level of one~s own or an economy s permanent income will be, it

is clear that people 1 s decisions to save are based on longer term factors rather

- 22 than tempor ary or short term influen ces.

..•
..••

It is also a varian t of this approac h

stable
which causes people with variab le incomes to save more than people with
income .

This hypoth esis is less testabl e for LDCs than for the United States •

count on
But in any event it would be well nigh imposs ible for governm ents to
this
a particu lar change in savings for financi ng a Develop ment Plan from
hypoth esis.
in
The life cycle hypoth esis could explain differe nces between countr ies

..,.'·

growth of
savings ratios, accordi ng to the structu re of popula tion and rates of
popula tion, etc.
easily .

But the theory does not lend itself to policy manipu lation

Suppose that the theory was valid, would it imply that an increas e in

the
popula tion growth would automa tically raise the savings ratio because
younge r part of the popula tion is saving for its old age?

Does it imply the

a stable popula tion would not increas e its savings ratio?
be
In any event, some of the assump tions needed for the theory appear to
too restric tive for applic ability to LDCs.

For exampl e, accordi ng to Albert

is
Ando and Franco Modigl iani, the assump tions are 1) The utility functio n
homogenous with respec t to consum ption at differe nt points of time.

2) The

ance.
individ ual neithe r expects to receive nor desires to leave any inherit
evenly over
3) The consum er at any age plans to consume his total resourc es
the remain der of his life span.

4) The rate of return on assets is constan t
1/

and is expecte d to remain consta nt.-

1/
- Albert Ando and Franco Modigl iani, "The Life Cycle Hypoth esis of Saving:
1963,
Aggreg ate Implic ations and Texts" in Americ an Economic Review , March
pp. 56-5~,

Another variant of income Es dP..te.:-mining savings was given by James s.
Duesenberry-¥ for the United States"

~1·3 emphasized that it was the relative

level of incom<:! between people wh:.1.ch determines consumption (and savings)
and not the absolute income.

'fois theory was used by Ragnar Nurkse1/ to

explain differences in saving ratios bet,;-1een countries and also why LDCs
were finding it e:~ceedingly d:i.ffic'.!lt to save more in the face of the tempting

•

supply of consume::: goods offered b3, de~~·eloping countries"

The real question,

which this approach does not answe:::, :!.s ,·:hy the LDCs are not then induced to
work harder and earn more fore:i.g:1 e2ccha113e from exports
afford the im~c-o:rt of new consumer goods o
solutions, Professor Nu-;:kse seggested

-3

flO

as to be able to

Although he does not provide economic
larger movemell';:: of savings and capital

from developed countries to LD'~s both in the form of gifts and loans.
A large..~ number of studies have been undertaken in recent years to test one
or more of the above theories using global country data on a cross section basis.
Some relate savicgs to income,others to population structure, growth, etc.

One

example of a st~dy of the influence of demographic conditions on savings is that
by Nathaniel IL Lef:(2/while another relat5.ng savings to income is that of H.S.

4/

lfouth~kker .-

There is no donbt th:1 t !.n a cross !'lert:ion ~n~lyl'lil'l between ~onntrie!': 1

which provides a suffic:i.ently large sflmrle, some good correlation results can be
obtained.

But the main question is whether the coefficients are such that every

country whi.-::h is either above of belo\• the average i:.1 either savings-income ratios

Jj Jam~:-~~ Duesenb:rry, ~~::-.·~_8D'Jing and the '.l'.'heo~ of Consumer Behavior
(:Cambridge, Hn.sso, 1949).

11see

E.agna.: Nurkse, Proble~_of_S§Pitll! Formatioq_~~ PJlderdeveloped
Countries (O.dord University ?ress,. 1957) PPo 56--81.

]/Nathaniel H. Leff, 11Depender:cy Rates and Savings Rates" in American
Economic .~~~.!i:::'i, December 1969 7 f p, .886,.896 •

.':±/ :-I. ":3; · ==o".::'.:~~::ikker_, "On Some :C~'. 12:rminanto of S,wing in Developed and Under•
1
Developed Coe:nt;:.i.,3s. : :Lu E .. A.G. Ro;:;:'..nson, (ed.) l.E.£1z!ems in Etbnomic Development-
(}1:1:r:~:·:.·~--~. ~ 7:. t~ Co, ;i :,t,,:! ;t, :.rv~tlor1; ~~~ 9:5.5.) PP~ 212.,227 ..
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or in savings-depe ndency ratios will move along the curve of the estimated equation.
There is no doubt that these factors have a bearing on explaining differences
An important question is whether other measures cannot increase

between countries.
the savings ratios.

Secondly it is clear that it will take LDCs a long time to

reach the per capita income levels of the developed countries and also to correct
adverse demographic factors"

We would agree with Leff that birth rates need to

be reduced in most LDCs but this conclusion can be drawn from intra-count ry analyses
and information .

One also doubts whether a model of internation al savings be

havior can be relevant to any one country.
d. Other Economic Consideratio ns
Most economists would agree that the main economic determinant s of
savings are both income and interest rates.

In addition to these two factors,

one would expect savings and self financing by businesses, to be influenced by
the opportunity for investment.

Growth companies need funds more rapidly than

can be provided by retained earnings, bank credit, and funds from the limited
financial markets in developing countries.

Savings would also be influenced by

the presence or lack of price stability, confidence in the currency and the
general investment climate.
Finally, there is the question of the supply of financial institution s.

1/

An interesting hypothesis was put forward by Professor Gurley-

who observed that

countries have different financial paths for development according to benefit and
cost co.nsiderat ions.

He said that,

"At any moment in the development process, a country will have some
optimal size of its financial structure which depends on all the
11 21
forces affecting ma::::ginal social benefit and cost curves of finance. -

]/John Gurley, "Financial Structures in Developing Countries" in David
Krivine (ed.), Fiscal and '.t-lof!.etary Problems in Developing States (Frederick A.
Praeger, New York, 1967) pp. 99-120.
l/Ibid., p. 108.

- 25 However, a financial system is only one way to mobilize savings for financing
alternative investment projects.

He said, that other ways of financing develop

ment were 1) Central Planning including appropriation of profits of state enter
prises.

2) Fiscal technique and 3) inflation.

He also felt that the financial

technique may be inadequate either because too few resources have gone into it
or because the resources in it are inefficiently employed.

He did, however,

conclude that it will generally pay a country t~ put more real resources in its
financial structure as it climbs up the development ladder.
Since the cost of establishing financial institutions are not so great, we
agree with Prof. Goldsmith, who in sum..~ing up at that conference said that the
real cost of running the financial systen is not critical and also that
"'.financial experience and technology seem to be more easily and
more rapidly transferable among countries than industrial or
agricultural technology, not to speak of oocial structure and
personality characteristics"l/
As between the different methods of mobilizing savings mentioned by Prof. Gurley,
inflation does not assure countries a sound and steady growth.
needed but not as much as implied by him.

Planning may be

It should also be noted that one

or more methods, of financing investment projects may be used at the same time.
For example, fiscal policy is a useful adjunct to financial institutions, but
there may be a trade-off in the amount of savings collected by each method.
Then, there is the question of whether the level of savings is determined by

the availability of financial institutions or vice-versa.

Since the cost of

establishing financial institutions is relatively not to large in relation
to future

profits.

We would favor having excess capacity in institutions,

even if it means some oisallocation of resources in the short run, rather

!/Ibid., p. 385.
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than that potential savers cannot find outlets for their savings.
e. Non-economic Deterninants
Besides economic factors, there are sociological and political consider
ations which would lead cou~tries to have different savings rates.

The relative

income hypothesis and the demonstration effect are partly economic and partly
sociological.

Adam Smith in mentioning non-economic reasons for people

wishing to save has said,
But the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of
bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally
calm and dispassionate.i comes with us from the womb, and
never leaves us till we go to the grave ••• An augmentation
of fortune is the means by which the greater 1 vart of men
propose and wish to better their conditions.11

As we have seen, other econonists have also mentioned non-economic determinants.
For example Irving Fisher said,
"We are accustomed, for instance, to ascribe to the Jews
a natural racial tendency to accumulate, though this
characteristic is certainly reinforced by, if not entirely
due to, the extraordinary influence of the Jewish tradition.
Of the Scots, it ·would be difficult to say how much of their
thrift is due to nature and how much to training handed down
from father to son. The American Negro is regarded by
nature a happy-go-lucky creature, but studies of Negro life
in Africa indicate that under favorable conditions the
Negro is self-denying, while recent experience with industri
al schools have demonstrated the fact that forethought and
saving can be readily fostered by training. Reckless waste
fulness has been creat~d in large part among the Negros by
tyranny and slavery."£ 1

1/Adam

Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book II Chapter 3, "On the Accumulati,on
of Capital". (The Modern Library edition, Randot:1 House, 1937) p. 324.
'/;/ Irving Fisher, "The. Theory s,f Interest" - As Deterrained by Impatience to
Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest it, (Kelley and Millman Inc., New York, 1954)
P• 377.
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There are perhaps some differences between races but this can only
be part of the so called frugality of the,Scots Jews or whatever race one
wishes to single out.

Undoubtedly , the ease with which man has been able to

eke out a comfortable living without too much effort in the past (as in the
land surplus countries) would tend to make people less thrifty.

Uncertainty

about the future either on a long term basis or from year to year is a power•
ful stimulant to higher marginal savings in good years, though not necessarily
higher on average.

The agriculturi sts, despite having lower levels of income

than those with regular income in the cities save more than others because they

are not sure what the next harvest will bring.

However, the agricultura l sector

in developing countries is not able to contribute as much as in the historical
past of the developed countries,n ot only because income levels

Ar,e

low but

because of social and religious obligations which induce peasants to spend
beyond their means.
These non-economi c determinant s of savings are less amenable to policy
manipulatio n than the economic factors.

However, the Indian government many years

ago tried to cut down on social and religious expenditure s, by the prohibition of
liquor consumption by Indians and by placing limits on the number of invitees
to weddings and other social occassions.
Obviously, changing social habits is a slow process, and Fisher quotes
about Gladstone from Mary W. Brown's book on "The Development of Thrift ,t!,/
as follows,
"But Gladstone insisted that habits were an arbitrary matter,
and that the fashion of spending would be displaced by the
fashion of saving as soon as opportunity and incentive were
afforded and the principle of imitation had time to operate.
The experience with English postal savings banks justified
his prediction .I/
!/see 'The Development of Thrift' by Mary W. Brown, New York, Macmillan
and Company, 1900.
I/Irving Fisher,££• £.!!., p. 378.
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Savings are also related to political and other risks and how hard one
has to work to get profits.

Those who migrate either permanently or temporarily

to other countries tend to save more because 0£ uncertainti es.

For example,

the Indian migrants, who came to Burma and Ceylon were generally believed to
have saved at higher rates than those of comparable income levels, back in
This indicates that the Indians (and also the Chinese migrants) having

India.

come overseas at great inconvenien ce to themselves and to their families, felt
it desirable to save a lot to make their temporary migration worthwhile.

It is

also known, that British Colonial servants saved a large proportion of their
income not only because of their ability to do so, since the purchasing power of
their salaries in the colonies was much higher than back home, but also because
of such factors as risk to good health, the discomforts of living abroad, and
the need for an early retirement in their home country.
III.

Toward an Integrated Theory of Savings
It is quite common in economic literature for writers to rewrite someone

else's theory as a special case of an extended version.

In attempting to put

down some preliminary thoughts on paper we have no wish to say that all the
theorie~ mentioned in the preceeding sections are special cases of our presen
tation.

It merely reflects our belief that reality cannot be explained by

any one theory, and that even conflicting hypotheses may have their places in
real life because people behave differently under different circumstanc es.
Finally, although a number of economists including Keynes, Fisher, and Marshall
mentioned both economic and non-economi c factors in explaining or determining the
level of savings, there is as yet no integrated theory.
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We believe that most individuals~businesses , or governments decide upon
what they would like to save (albeit sometimes only indirectly after deciding
upon consumption) and that the final ex post level of savings may or may not
be the sum of ex ante plans depending not only upon Keynesian analysis of how

total income influences total savings but also that simple decisions to save
even out of a given total level of income may be influenced by other people's
decisions.

The decision to save by each unit in an economy is influenced

its ability, its willingness!/ and the opportunity to do so.

hr

We can then write

each. unit's savings as a function of these three factors and for the economy as
~

.- ..,.,-

whole, it would be the sum of the individual units' savings less whatever

duplication occurs, and whatever r-eductions would take place between ex ante
aod exposte savings due to changes in total income--a la' Keynes--or to o.ther

sociological factors~ We can write the total savings (net) equation for the
economy as
...

S

s

'/J {A, W, O)

tfflSl"e Sis snvings; Ai~ ~hi1i~y, Wis willingness, and O is opportunity.

---·

[l]

Each

of the independent variables of this first equation would be functions of other
. ""!";,.··~

,,

-r
~-

··, ~

/_,_,,
:

economic and non••economic variables.

For example, ability to save would depend

on such factors as income (Y), structure of population or dependency rates, {N),

;

and wealth (K).

--------._,..._,
--------~----~-1/

I should like to thank Professor Ranis for suggesting that some of my
- earlier thoughts on ability and willingness of people to save should be expanded
· and developed. He, of course, bears no responsibility for the line of development
.. outlined here.

.. ,... ...;,

{'
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We may denote this
[2]

A = a (Y, N, K, •• )

The willingness to save would depend on such factors as how much economic induce
ment is given to the individual through the level of interest rates (i), the
stage of life that one individual is in the life cycle (L) and cultural factors
such as the relative position in the c1.ass or social ladder (C).

For example,

it is well known that there are different savings propensities between agriculturists
and urban workers, and between professionals and entrepreneurs.
We may denote this willingness equation as
[3]

Finally, we come to the opportunity principle which is more closely related
to the question of financial intermediation.

The opportunity to save depends on

such factors as the extent of financial intermediation (F) available to the saving
units and on possibility of using self generated funds for financing one I s own
investment (Ir), or in other words the marginal efficiency of capital.

It is

well known that business units retain earnings in order to finance investment,
as is also done by the agriculturists in the rural areas.
Thus we may denote the opportunity equation as
0 ,.:: ;\ {F, I

r

In all the four equations above the symbols
notations and not meant to be constants.
in equations 2; 3, and

l,,.

[4)

o •• )

0, a, B, and ;\are functional

If the nature of each of the functions

can be properly specified) and if one could really

measure the changes in abilityJ willingness and opportunity to save in a given
economy over time through the use of prox)7 variables,':lnd- also proj-ect•·-what· ·. ·
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changes are likely to occur within the next plan period, then one could perhaps
derive an estimatin g equation or equations (if each of the above equations is
rewritten for sectors such as household s, businesse s and general governmen t)
by substitut ing the coefficie nts from equations 2, 3, and 4 in equation 1.

How•

ever, it is doubtful whether the present state of knowledge about developin g
countries would make that possible.

All we can indicate now is the nature of

the functions in each of the eq11ations w~th some simple statistic s of cross
section budget surveys to indicate orders of magnitude and of signs.
First of all; let us look at equr,tion 2 and see what sort of function
a is likely to be.

That ability to save depends on increases in real income

i.;e., money income at constant pr:1-ces is self evident.

The statistic al data

in budget surveys usually show that at low income levels, there is negative
savings and that as income increases , savings rise,

In Table 1~ data from the

budget survey for Kenya is presented , while in Table 2 the savings of farmers in
Korea according to size of farms are given.
that savings rise with income.

It will be seen from both tables

However, from the Kenya data it is apparent

that income has to reach a minimum critical level before savings can begin.
The lower range of Kenyan middle income workers are presumabl y either living off
their assets brought from their -Jillages in migrating to Nairobi or on contribut ions
from relatives in :rural Areasc

The Korea data confirms what one has always sus

pected that it is the agricultu ral sector which; having acc~ss to food and other
necessiti es, is able to save even at low levels of income.

An annual income for

the Korean farming household of 118JOOO won is equivalen t to about $400 at the
official exchange rate which reflect~ mainly the prices of internati onally traded

• i

goons,.

It: sinr;;.ld be :noted

that wealth ccui.d be rc::;:;r::rG::~i >J:3 . ,nriabis 2:tfecti.ng r-.o:: ein.Ly r.bi.lity to save

and

more depen<le;x,::,: o:·.r. :

of this :~endency ..

aJ.though

time) 1:n.,-5. s i::.

in

illCCF:8 .,.

how to a:LL01:; ·" ....,

.. :..:_ ·-· ,';·_,
•

~

vs

that

o:'.:
1<"'.I"

then

0:.1e

w:i. th inc o,:i~,,

.-.-,~ ,-... 8

n:_:_·.
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equation :in. die variable (C).
As regards the second part of the question about whether with additional
dependents his ability will be adversely affected proportionately, it seems
clear that since savings are at the margin after consumption and as expenditure
on an additional child is less than on an adult, the answer would depend on
the ratio of savings/total expenditure and expenditure on child/total expenditure
ratios.

The net result on savings will depend on these two ratios.

If the

saving's/expenditure ratio is .20 and the marginal child/expenditure ratio is
0.05, then with each additional child, the savings gets less more than pro
portionately even though the marginal child/expenditure ratio is constant
because the savings will get smaller each time for example .20, .15, .10, .OS,
etc.
Therefore, toronclude on equation 2, we say that, normally, the ability
t.o save rises more than proportionately with income, while the ability to save

falls more than proportionately with more dependents.
and

aA

~
V

l~

<

O.

In other words

aA

ay > 1

Since most people in lif~-tend to have more children before having

rising incomes, the function may be n~gative in ear-ly--years--of-~c.le.,._and----
positive and rising in the latter years of one's life.
it is clear that even if
with the more wealth.

. aS
aK

As for the wealth effect

is negative, one's ability to save will increase

Therefore,

~

> 0 but less than 1.

The above comments apply mainly to household sector.

✓--

//

....-···

We now have to see

_,.-..,..-,what __the ability to save function means for the business sector and the government •
For the business sector, by higher income is meant more profits and this would
depend partly on business efficiency, partly on whether the unit is operating in
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a growth industry or elsewhere} and partly on industrial structure and market
conditions such as monopoly, economies of scale, protection from imports, etc.
It is clear that ability to save would expand more than p1:oportiona tely with
business profits, partly because firms are constrained by their stock holders
to pay out a certain dividend even when profits are lowo

Business units do

not have dependency rates but one could imagine that all the social obligations
(in developed countries) thrust upon businesses; such as contributio n to charity,
political party supporting, anti.,JJollut ionJ etc, are a sort of dependency claims.
However, these come much later in a i:orporate busfness 1:i.fe when Y is already
rising rapidly and; therefo1:e, can be ignored.
For governments ot dev.;:loping countries, the analogy with the household
sector is very close an the ability to save c:citeri.a.

'Ihe income of governments
~ > 1.

is government revenue and hers aL-10 one would normally expect

3Y

This

may appear to be cont"cadicto ry tc the so called "Please effect n according to
which the governments propensity to cons,.1me out of :r.evenues may be greater than
one.
of N.

But this is not so because we would attribute such behavio:.:

to the effect

The dependen~y of governments manifests itself in the amount of welfare

expenditure s which governm,~nts feeJ. they have to ha-ve.

It also includes maintain

ing high wage rates coMparable to those in developed countries inherited from
the colonial periods.

[Nocable exceptions are Burma and India]

It includes

recruiting all returning statP. scholars as a matte:.: of poli~y even if they cann6t
be usefully absorbed in government eer-;;ice.

It j_ncfodes giving jobs to party

followers and workers for the !"1!ling elite to stay in po-wsr.

It also includes

necessary new current e~~pen.d:Ltu:res on defence; police, foreign affairs, etc.
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which in many African and Asian countries rose sharply after independence.

Thus

for the government of most newly independent and also for some of the other older
developing countries

£aN

< O.

As to where each government sector is on the ability side depends on these
two factors.
and Niger,the

But it is clear that for the small African countries such as Dahomey

.a!
aN

was an important reason why France had to continue giving annual

budget support for a long period after independence.
As regards the third equation on willingness, it is clear why higher
interest rateswould induce more willingness to save.

would increase willingness too much.

We believe

But it is doubtful if it

aw

As for the relationship

al< 1.

between willingness and life cycle, the hypothesis of Professor Modigliani would
perhaps be appropriate.

In other words, in the early years one is not willing to

save, but one does in later years.
ning, 2)

aw
aL

.ill:!<
aL

The five phases are 1)

> 0 but less than 1, 3) then

aw
aL

> 1, 4)

aw
at

0 in the begin

less than l,and S)

1!!
3L

goes to O and then negative.
The relationship between willingness and the position on the social ladder
or relative income which is denoted by (C) is probably stronger than even the life
cycle.

The reason for this belief is that the constraints on (L) are self imposed.

They come from one's own decision to spend or save with reference to one's age.
On the other hand, the keeping up with the Jones' and emulating expensive customs
of a particular social group are very strong.

In fact, one of the major causes

of rural indebtedness, some of which is dead weight and unproductive, come from
spending money on religious and social affairs.
remain like this for one's whole life.

Thus

~

<

0 and is likely to

Of course, there may be savings because
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of rising income, etc.,.J.e. because of the influence of other variables.

When

a person is promoted from one job to another, income risesbut willingness to save
may be reduced more than proportiona tely if certain conspicuous consumption items
such as better homes, better cars, better schools for children are expected to
be correlated with the job.
In the attached Table 4, savings from a Mexico field budget survey are
listed by groups of income and size of cityo
had the data by occupation and incomeo

It would have been better to have

But even so, it is clear that the relative

positions of incomes have a bearing on the amounts saved.,

A particular income

level in a large city is not the same es in a smaller city, not only because of
differences in the cost of living but also because of social position.

Dusenberry

discovered an important economic proposition that savings is determined not by
absolute income but by relative income.
In concluding for households on the willingness to save

[2]

we have seen that the partial derivative is positive with respect to i always,
negative with respect to (C) and that the sign changes for L.
to project the net effect of all three variables on

w,

It is difficult

but it is clear that

interest rate policy wiH have to be used actively in order to offset the negative
influence of (C).
For business units, the willingness to save will be a function only of (i)
and for governments it will be function of (i) and (C) only,.

Here again the

function will be sometimes negative to (C) because some governments in LDCs do
compete with one another in inviting internation al conferences , constructin g

buildings) palaces, p2rl-:::s, .3::J.d 3ending delega.tes o,~ offi-::~21 t:to.ve.:.; etc.
Furthermore in election yonrs, governments tend to spen..1 cons:l.uerably more
than in other yea~s.
The coefi:i.cients of ths function of the fou.:th equat:i.on ,1:i.1.l be positive
with respect to

/1.s for I , if

or not.

r

the rate of retu:r:i :i..:J r1s:tr:z; :rc~>idly th.en

For the fourth

influenced by

[l]
As for the p~2vious ~q~atioils, it is best to proceed by scviu3s of each

restraining facro1 ~ay

factor,

At first

As

tiLf

3S
< l, l2ter it wil~ equal~ encl stil\ later it coulri bs greater than
2l\.
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iut this state of affairs does not last for long because soon the willing

ness begins to change, at first slowly, and later more rapidly.

At the stage of

say medium income levels, it is then the willingness factor which determines
savings because even though

~ may be rising and greater than

1 we have

falling and perhaps being negative.
At a still later stage of rising income levels through time, we have the
opportunity factor becoming a limiting factor o

This is quite apparent for the

rich man who has the ability and willingness but since oppo:rtunity for hiln,

though greater than that for a poor man, does not expand as fast as his ability
and willingness, it becomes the limiting £actor.

An example, of the opportunity

variable becoming a limiting can be seen from the agricultural sector of a rich
but stagnating economy.

The landlord has both the ability and uillingness to

save, but since the opportunity to put his funds in worthwhile investments or
deposit them with acceptable financial institutions does not exist, he does not
increase his savings by as much as his ability or his willingness to do so.
could also apply to the

rPn.<lnt"

fc11"mP'I" T,Thn

i,::: P.<1rning 8

This

more than satisfactory

level of income but does not s.ave increasing amount$ out of le'.lrger incomes.
To conclude this section on the household sector, it was se.cn above
for equations 2, 3, and 4 that most of the variables which affect AJ

w,

and 0

change slowly over time and are not subject to policy manipulation e~~cept income
in equation [2 ], interest in equation [3] and financial intern;ediation in equation
[4].

The social ladder variable (C) and life cycle (L) in equaticn [3] are

very important for any one individual, but when one aggregates for the economy
as a whole the pluses and minuses largely cancel out and thus they become 2nd.
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order or 3rd. order conditions except iu an economy with a rapidly growing
population or with drastic changes in social structure,

?nus for policy formu

lation, the best way to increase savings of the household sector is to increase
national income as whole rapidly, have a correct interest rate policy and increase
the supply of financial institutions.
Now we come to the busineas sector.

Here also, in the light of comments

already made earlier on equatious 2, 3, and 4) it will be noted that the con
clusions for this sector. are not much d:i.fferent from those for,~the household
sector.

A m:i.no.r difference is thcit the opportunity variable of iacreasing the

supply of financial institutions may not by itself encourage business savings.
Though even het"e, en expansio·.-i. of fiuand.al intermediation couJ.d lead to increased
business savings be~ause loans c,::umot ba obtained f:rcm bmks w:i.thout adequate
collateral and only for a .small p:-oporti.on of the :i.n11escment.

Business savings,

and investments a re more:: easily influenced by tax poU.cies m,d the likely return
on investments"

The governments of dev2lopine; couatries should 7 therefore, give

priority to investments for infrastr-uctive 5 etc.,

t10

teat the marginal efficiency

of private capital will increase.
When we come to the goverr:meat sec·.:or: the:ce are frnporr.ant differences
between its savings function and that of the private sectoro

'1.'o begin with,

the interest rate is no longer an impo,~i:ant varinble di=-::termining willingness
(W) to save.

But the reLltive positioa (C) :l.n t;,e social ladder cannot be

ignored on the grounds that there is only one govern,r:ent and that the aggregation
solution used for households would not ·oe appl:1.~ah1eo
some active_ "keeping up with the Jones"

On the contrary, there is

going on for governments not to mention

'

- 40 externally imposed minimum standards of health, education and welfare on LDC's
based on the more developed countries' standards.

Then again, financial insti

tutions in the fourth equation, though important, do not play a crucial role for
governments.

The productivity of capital cannot be used in isolation because

a government has to be coucerned with social productivity and not with the
productivity of the government sector alone.
Finally, even assuming that the unfavorable effects of the government
sector's

~ are offset

by the more positive effects of

~ (by govern-

ment raising more tax revenue and saving a greater proportion out of marginal
tax revenue), it is not always clear that private sector. £avings would not
fall by as much as the increase in government savings.
IV.

Evolution of Net Natiopal Savings in Developing Countries
Some of the important questions concerning the evolution of net national

savings in developing countries are~

1) Have the average net savings rates in

relation to national income risen during the last twenty years?

2) Has the gap

in the net savings ratios between developing and developed countries narrowed,
widened or remained more or less the same?

3) Why are there such wide differences

in savings performances between developing countries, which is another way of
asking about the main determinants of savings.
a) Trends in Savings
Tables 5 and 6 provide data on net national savings ratio's to national
income for 35 developing and 15 developed countrieso

The savings data in

these tables are net of depreciation and include savings of the government sector.

- 41 The countries in each table have been classified according to net savings rates
above 25% of national income, between 20% and 2409%, 15% to 19.9%, 10% to 14.9%,
5% to 9o9% and sav:i.ngs less then 5%o

The tables also provide data on interest

rates, growth rates, price increases ~nd balance of payments deficits on current
account which are considered as the more important determinants of savings.
Table 7 summarizes the distribution of countries according to savings ratio's
and it confirms that developing countries do not save as much as developed
countries.

'l'hus, of the 15 developed countri<::s, thirteen of them had savings

rates amounting to more then 15% of national incomeJ while of the 35 developing
countries, 26 of them or about 75% of them had savings rates amounting to less
then 15% of nat:l.onal income.

0£ the n:i.ne developing countries sav:i.ng more then

15 percent of national income, three othe:.:s

B.re oil producing countries (Libya,

Iraq and Venezuela) and three of them (Thailand, Taiwan_, and Philippines) get
large amounts of U.S. foreiga aid and investments,

It should be noted that

about 50 percent of developing countries (17) cluster around the range of
10 to 14.9%0

But this by itself should not be considered a poor performance

because some of the high income and high growth countries such as the United
States and the United Kingdom have sav~ngs rates in this same range.

This

fact tends to reinforce the observation made earlier that it is not only the
savings rate but the manner in w11ich the savings is utilized to finance
investment and the resulting marginal productj_vity of capital which determine
growth rates"

- 42 As for trends in the savings rates, it appears that about two-thirds
of the developing countries (20)1/ have been successful in their efforts to
raise more capital domestically, while 13 countriesl/ appear to have gone back
wards during th<= past two decades,

The countries which seem to have perfor-med

very badly are Iraq whose savings rate fell from an average of 33.5% in 1953-54
to 17.3% in 1960-62, Mauritius which fell from 22,0% in 1953-54 to 14.0% in
1965-68, Peru from 18o4% in 1950,,54 :i.n to 12.5%.in 1965-67, 2arbados

from 16.8% in 1950-54 to 8.4~{, in 1960~64;, and the Netherlands Antilles from
17.0% in 1957-59 to 6,3% in 1965.,67,,

Of the countriec which have done better between the earliest and
latest periods given in Table 5 7 ge~1erally 1950··54 and 1965~68, the ones with
remarkable jumps in savings -rates a1:e Libya from 26% to

li-3.

7%;, Taiwan from

11.5% to 20.0%, Phillippin.es from 9o0% to 15,.8%_, Togo frot:1 5.0% to 14.5%,

Korea from 7.5% to 12.3%, Jamaica from 5.2% to 12.0%J Panama from a negative
of 0.8% to positive 10.5%, and Chile from a small 0.2% to a respectable 7.3%
High or rising interest rates in real terms we.re one of the

Lua.;_11 dt:t\::Lu1.i.11a11t::;

of increased savings rates in Ch:l.le, Jamaica, Korea ar..d the Philippines, while
in Taiwan a more rapid growth and a lower rate of inflation also helped to
increase national savings.

As to expected,tbe same foctors were not equally

important or preser;.t in every success story~

In the Philippines) for example,

.!/These are Boliv~-Braz~~~ Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Korea; Libya) Malaysia, PananaJ Paraguay, Philippines, Sierra Leone,
Taiwan, Togo, Thai.land.; Tu.nis:i.a 1 Uruguay and V:i.et Nam.

'J./ There are Bm:badosJ Burma_,, Colornbiai Ecuador; Guyana, I·raq, Mauritius
Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua_, .Peru, South Rhodesia; Trinidad and Tobago,
and Venezuela"

although the interest rate was a positive factor, the growth rate was slower
and there was also a slight increase in consumer prices which normally would
adversely affect savings rateso

In Korea} the higher interest rates together

with higher growth rates and lower rates of price increase combined together
to push up the savings rates.

In Chile, although the growth rates were not

too much different over time there was a noticable reduction in the rate of
price increase which reinforced the positive influence of the interest rate.
Since the savings rates ir. 12 out of the 15 developed countries have
also increased du:ring the past two decades, it is difficult to say whether
the gap between the less developed and more developed countries has narrowed
or not.

Although it is more difficult for the developed countries to raise

their savings ratios sharply, because they are already at a higher level,
there have been impressive increases in savings rates for this group of
countries also.

Thus Japanrs saving rate has increased from 19.0% to 29.0%,

Switzerland from llf.4% to 21.3%, France from 12.2% to 20.3%, Italy from 11.3%
to 18.3%, and Belguim from 9.0% to 16.8%.

In order to arrive at some conclusion,

one has to compare the median ratios for the two groups of countries in the
earliest and latest periods.

From this we find that in the first period,

generally of 1950-54, the median percentages were 16.4 percent and 11.5 per
cent for the developed and developing countries 7 respectively<
1965-68 period they were 20.0 percent and 11.9 percento

In the

Thus, it can be

concluded that the gap in savings rates between the two groups of countries
has widened over time, despite the advances m<1de in the majority of the less
developed countries.
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In the previous sub~section, some of the data contained in Tables
5 and 6 were used to explain the performance of some of the countries with
high saving rateso

In this section we will analyse the effectiveness of any

one determinant by itself in influencing the direction of savings.

Obviously,

this approach has its limitations not only because the other factors listed
in the table may have been operating in the same or opposite directions, but
also because other non-listed factors, such as financial intermediation, may
have played an important role in changing the level of savings.
Tables 8 and 9 surnn1ari.ze the relationship between changes in each of
the determinants and the changes in savings rates.

A circle indicates that

the relationship is as expected while a cross indicates that the relation
ship is not as expected,

One expects savings rates to be positively as

sociated with higher interest rates and larger per capita growth rates and
negatively associated w:i.th price increases.

is not easily apparent.

On the other hand, the!!_ priori

As far as stati3t:tce.l identities are concerned,

domestic investment will be financed by national savings and foreign savings,
i.e. current account deficit in the balance of payments"

And one could assume

that national savings would be unaffected by the availabity of foreign resources,
increases in which will be used to finance more investment.

However, an

increased inflow of resources from abroad could lead to more consumption and
less national savings, especially if worthwhile investment projects do not
exist.

Furthermore, most LDC 2 s c:i.."e seldom in internal financial equilibrium
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and, consequently, the balance of payments deficit is more likely to be a
reflection not of an automomous inflow of funds from abroad but a forced
draft of borrowing abroad and use of exchange reserves, etc, resulting from
inappropriate domestic financial and developmental policies.

Therefore, for

the purpose of Tables 8 and 9 the e:;{pected relationship is that national
savings rates are negatively associated with balance of payments deficits.
Since reliable data on interest rates are not available for most
LDC's, the first column in Table 8 reports the relationship for only 15 out
of 33 countries.

In 12 LDC 3 s, national savings rates are positively associated

with interest rates and in only 3 LDCs (Burma, Colombia and Taiwan) is there
a negative relationship.

Burma"s case needs no explaining, as at present it

is not a market oriented economy, while in Colombia other factors such as
more rapid price increases in recent year.shave prevented the savings rate
from rising.

In Taiwan, the apparent negative relationship is misleading

because the rate of interest has fallen partly as a result of the increase
in savings and loanable funds and partly because of monetary policy.

Further

more, the real level of interest rates in Taiwan is still high relative to
the levels prevailing in other countries.
In the developed countries also_, the interest rate relationship
to national savings is as expected in 10 out of the sample of 15 countries.
For most of the five countries with unexpected relationships namely Germany,
Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the United States; other factors were present.
In any event, one does not expect to expl::li.:c. natio·aa1 savings rates for the
very advanced industrial countries w:i.th only the limited number of determinants

~
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listed in Table 9.
The relationship of per capita growth rates to national savings
rates behaves as expected for the majority of both developed and developing
countries.

The price relationship though valid for the LDC 1 s is not apparent

for most of the developed countries.

Here one has to invoke the rule that

the money-illusion is tlere, and hence price increases do not adversely
effect savings rates_. only as long as the rate of inflation. is small, i.e.
less than 2 or 3 percent per annum, It is also interesting to note that almost
all LDCs with savings rates of about 15% and above (ioe. about a quarter of
the total LDC' s in the table 5) had rates of inflation of less than 3 or 4
percent per annum L1 recent years.
The balance of payments effect is also as expected for 22 out of
the 33 LDC's.

Among the countries with unexpected relationships are Costa

Rica, Guatemala, Honduras., Ko.;:·ea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Taiwan where

autonomous inflow of foreign capital and general equilibrium conditions
would naturally nulJ.ify the hypothes:'.s of negative

rP1 ,:irinn..:hip hPt-T,7PPn

national savings and balance of payments deficits.

c.

Savings bv Sestor~
One is :~nterested in the distribution of national savings between

sectors such as general government., corporat::.ons,an d households for a number
of reasons.

Firstly_. there is the position of Professor Lewis who has

said that "Apart from the cases wheee the farmers are squeez:::d to provide for
capital formation, the main source of savings in any economy is profits,
. t ri. b ute d or und J_str1.
·
· b ute,1.
...1
i,l
d is
-/

On the prem:i.se that very little capital

-------------•:r--•----l1w. Arthu'.!'.' Lewis, Theory of ~~!llic_gro~ (Earper
p. 231.

and Row, 1965)

- 47 -

exists in LDCs to earn large capitalists profits, he concludes that govern
ment savings has to increase more than proportionately to national income
through higher than average marginal rates of taxation.!/

But if we had

data to compare profits in LDCs to the low level of income, the profit rate
could be higher than in developed countries and this would enable savings
rates to rise.
Secondly, even though savings data are not available between agriculture
and industry, the relative importance of household savings between developing
and developed countries would provide some insights to this question.

Un

fortunately, the data on household savings are usually the least reliable,
being derived as a residual from a residual.
1. Government sector savings
Tables 10 and 11, provide information on total net national savings in
developing and developed countries and the percentage distribution between
the main sectors.

The summary table below shows the relative importance of

government sector savings during the period 1965-68 for LDCs and the DCs.
As expected, the frequency distribution of the DCs is more of a
normal curve with general government in a little over half the countries
collecting between 25% and 35% of total savingso
are distributed at two extremes.

In the LDCs, the countries

The government sector in one-fifth of the

countries could collect only less than 5% of total savings and another fifth
were able to collect between 5% and 15%.

However, in nine countries,l/ or

l/Ibidc, P• 239.
l/Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Korea, Libya, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, Togo
and Venezuela.
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~

.2£mmary of Tables 10 & 11
General Governmen~ NeLJavings, 12§5-1968

General Government Net
Savings as % of total
Savings

Developing Countries
No.
% Distribution

Developed Countries
No. % Distribution

Below 5.0

7

20.6

5

- 14.9

3

20.0

7

20.6

15

24.9

2

13.3

3

8.8

25

- 34.9

8

53o3

3

8.8

35

- 44.9

2

13.3

3

8.8

45

- 54.9

0

0

2

5.9

0

0

9

26.5

15

99.9

34

100.0

55 and above
Total

over a quarter of the LDCs, over 55 percent of total savings was collected by
the government sector.

The fact that these nine countries were distributed

widely between high (Libya, Venezuela, Togo, and Korea) 9 medium, and low
{Paraguay and Sierra Leone)

co,:ndng,::

rnt1nf-1""1P<:)'

c,11ggp,:::f-,:::

f-h::if-

high gmrArnmAnt"

savings in themselves are not sufficient to generate high savings rates.
One can also look at the government savings data in relation to national
income, rather than as a changing share of total savings.

If Professor Lewis'

hypothesis is correct, one would expect higher government savings rates relative
to national income to be associated with higher total savings rates, also
relative to national income.

A study of the data shows five countries (Chile,

Korea, Panama, Paraguay ar.d Tun:lsia) with this relationship and three countries
(Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua) with the opposi.te relationship, i.e. rising
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government savings rates and falling total savings rateso

However, in 20

LDCs, government saving's :rates have declined relative to national income.
2. Savings by Corporat:i.on_s au9 -~?!-!.seholli
1
Savings by corporations are generally more important in the DC s than

in the LDCso

Howevel'.', in a number of LDC 1 s such as the Barbados, Chile,

Guatemala, Jamaica> Mau~itius, Nicaragua, PeruJ and South Rhodesia more
than half of the total savings are gener.atGd by the corporate sector.
Some of this is due to s&.vings of foreign corporations,

In other countries

low corporate savings may be due to the corporate sector underestimating profits
in order to pay taxes"
Many factors includivg th~ rates of taxationJ opportunities for
reinvestment and the general gro,-,th of profits help determine the level
of savings in the corporate sector"

However, according to some writers,

inflation -would tend to increase corporate savings more proportionately
than savings by other sectors because wage lags and the inability of
consumers and fixed income recipients to protect themselves bring about

a shift in real income from other sectors to the corporate sector.

Further

more, since the corporate sector's propensity to save is greater than that
of the other sectors, total savings is said to inc~ease also.

While this

is theoretically possible, it is interesting to note that corporate savings

net of depreciation allowances have been important in more countries with

price stability (eng, Barbados., Guatemala; Jam~i.ca; Nicaragua, South
.
. cc-untr:i..es
- t h art in
• •
• and Maur1.tiu1o,1
Rho d esia

. ,..n
WJ.-..

(Ch"l. l e ) •
'
• -r:·1 atJ.on
1.n..

- 50 Another factor is whether the law allows asset revalvation and/or depreciatio n
allowances at real replacement costs.

In an inflationar y context, it may

turn out that the true net saving rate declines"
A comparison of changes in corporate savings as a percent of national
income, between the eQrliest period (e.ga 1950-54) and the latest period
(e.g. 1965-68)) reveals that 11 countries!/ had higher corporate savings
rates associated with higher total savings rates"

On the other hand, only

. t e d w1. th -iower t o t a 1
·
, sav1ngs
· h er corporace
ra. t es associa
· 2 / h ad- h ig
7 count ries-

savings rates.

TheJ:e

\J3re

2no~her 7 countd.er; with lower corporate savings

rates in the latest period as ~ornpa:red to the earlfost period.

All this

suggests that changes in co:.:-porate sector sav:!.ngs in LDCs have been more
important than changes in 3ove·L•nrnent sector saving:.::,, relative to national
income.
The household sector appears to be an important source in Guyana,
Honduras, Netherland.s Antilles 2 Philipp:Lnes , Thailand, 'I'rindad and Tobago,
and Uruguay with more than half of the total savings orginating from
this sector.

Except for Uruguay, all these countries have had only very

small increase,s in consumer prices in the lnst twenty years, which un
doubtedly helped to inspir2. confi.dence on the part of the saving households
Another way of looking at the savings of the hDuseholds is in relation
to disposable incomes.

Tni.s approach h8.s the advantage of isolating the

influence of the level of t:i.xatj_on on the c0nt'.".'ibutio n of the household

-------- ---····-- ---,--,-- ·-

Chile, GPateu::1ls; Libya, Jam;;;ica, Korea:. Panama, Paraguay,
Philippines_ , Togo an<l Uruguay"
'l:../ Colombia, Honduras,, i\etherlanC:2 Ailtilles _, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad
and Tobago:- and Vene7,ueJ.a,

!/ Bolivia;,

- 51 sector to the national savings effort.
In tables 12 and 13 data for personal income, disposabl e incomes and
savings of household s out of disposabl e income have been provided.

It can

1
be noted that the burden of taxation is greater in DCs than in the LDC s.

In all the 15 DC's in Table 13, except in South Africa, taxation on house
holds was more than 10 percent of disposabl e income and in some countries
(France, Germany, Netherlan ds and Sweden) it was above 20 percent.

On the

other hand, in all LDC's except Chile and Colombia, the rate of taxation
was less than 10 percent of disposabl e income and in over two-third s of
them it was less than 5 percent,

Despite this lower level of taxation in

LDCs, the household sector saves a smaller proportio n of disposabl e income
than in the DCs because of the lower ability to save.

The summary table

below shows that in almost half the LDCs, household s were able to save
less than S percent of their disposabl e incomes while in about half of the
DC's, household s saved more than 12.5% of disposabl e income.
Despite the poorer performan ce of LDC's as a group when compared to
the DC's, significa nt increases in the personal savings ratios have occurred
in the last twenty years in about one-third of the countrie s!/listed in
Table 12.

However, in the vast majority of LDC's personal savings ratio's

have either fallen or remained basically unchanged .
11
·
Taiwan, Thai 1 and,
·
~i·bya, Ma 1aysia,
- costa R"i ca, Guatema 1a, Jamaica,
Uruguay and Vietnam.
T
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Savings of Households as Percent of Disposable Income, 1965-68

Developed Countries
No. % Distribution

Savings as% of
Disposable Income

Developing Countries
~- % Distribution

Less than 5%

0

o.o

14

46.7

-

7.49

2

14.3

4

13.3

7.5

9.99

1

7.1

4

13.3

10.0

- 12.49

4

28.6

3

10.0

12.5

- 14.99

3

21.4

0

o.o

15.0

- 17 .49

3

2L4

2

6.7

17.5 and over

1

7.1

3

10.0

llf

99.,9

30

100.0

5

Total

V. Financial Intermediation.! :/
Economists working on problems of developing countries are interested
in the question of financial intermediation partly because it has been observed
that the economic growth of more advanced countries was accompanied by an
increase in financial super structure.

A natural question, therefore, is

whether the present LDC 1 s should try to develop their financial structures
to promote more rapid economic growth or should they leave it to market forces
to react in future when there is an increased demand for these financial

----~--- ----,--·· ·--this section,
!/ In
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A related questio n is the type of financ ial interm ediatio n which
should be develop ed to finance investm ents.

It has been noted by Profes sor

Goldsm ith that DCs, especi ally the United States, finance d investm ents
in
railroa ds and other industr ies through direct issuanc e of bonds to the
investi ng public .

.-

In later years, indirec t investm ents namely re-inve stment

of funds collect ed by banks, and other financ ial interm ediarie s became
more
import ant.

In the majori ty of LDC's, investm ent is still predom inantly self

finance d, either out of undistr ibuted profits or purchas e of shares in
family
and private concern s.

The small propor tion of investm ent which is market

finance d is carried out through indirec t means rather then through new
stock issues and bond issues on ths stock market s.

While many LDC's are

~ncoura ging the establi shment of stock exchang es to encoura ge direct
finance of investr aents, it can be questio ned whethe r it is necessa ry for
LDC's to go the same route as the DCs instead of taking a short cut by
leaving it to specia lized banks, mutual funds and even governm ent lending
funds to finance private investm ent indirec tly.
The kind of financ ial super structu re that should be built by the
LDC's depend s, partly on the opport unity cost of setting up a particu lar
financ ial institu tion and, partly on the benefi ts which would be derived
from increas ed savings and a better alloca tion of funds for financi ng invest
ments.

The latter point is depend ent on the kind of financ ial instum ents

which potent ial savers would like to purchas e; keeping in mind profita
bility,
confide nce or safety, and liquid ity of these assets.

·~ 5l~

~

a. Role of Financial Institutions in the Saving Process
In sub..section (d; nother Economic Consideration 9 of section II
''Relevance of Existing Theories of Savings for 1DCis; reference has already
been made to Professor Gurleyws suggestion that besiGes financial intermediation,
there are other ways of finaacing development, including the fiscal technique
and inflation.

Policy malt~rs in many of the post

w21:

independent countries

in Africa and Asia usually v:i.ew the financing of :f.nvestment by bank credit
as synonymous with financia:i.. intermed:i.ation, withcut distinguishing whether
the source of banking funds is central 1nmk 1:ediscounts or the government
printing currency on the on,:: hand and fir:.ancial s.:ivings on the other hand.
A similar vi1;;;w· iG :;,.;_so hG1d by some :;conornists., mainly of the structur
alist school, who feel that defi-:::it financing a,n increase ,.·P-al incomes through
forced savings financing investment.s"

They wouid ax·gue thE!t inflation helps

to redistribute incone from sectors with low snv:i.ngs ratbs to sectors with
higher savings rates.

Business m1;1n have r,ccess to b':lnk loans_, and if they

need more fu11ds to make .i.r1vestme1it, th~:: banking syatt:111 shotild

p1.uvidt::

it.

On the other hand, economiste who beli.eve that in:Ebtion does 110t add any
additional resources to finance ir..v estments hff<;e ~::r·gued that the capacity
of the banking system to finance de·-relopm2,nt is lirn:~tcd by the willingness
df.

individuals to increase financial ,1avingso

Thi.3 in turn is a function of

the rel2tive :i.mportance of cxi.sting financial ass,'=tS s,,1,c:~, as r.ioney and quasi
money.

Mrs J'. Jo Polak by using money~income ::-atios to project likely

increases in H.mmcial savings, and by taking into account the desirability
of the banking system to sati.sfy a country's need to increase its reserves of

gold and foreign exchange and to provide adequate financing of inventories,
has concluded that the banking systemis role in financing of fixed invest-

1/

ment must be quite small."-

While this is probably ture, historically, it

does not necessarily follow that finnncial savings cannot increase markedly
in future with correct interest rate and other appropriate financial policies.
Under such conditions, it may be more efficient to e:ncourage commercial banks
to make term loans rather than to ha·ve funds channelled through other kinds
of institutions, such as the stock market, £0i: example.
Apart from whether financial savings collected by the banking
system are likely to be small in future) as implied by Nr. Folak, there is
the question of the mechanism -,md :,;:ole played by financial institutions in
the sav:i.ngs-investment process.

There are three major ways in which

efficient financiaJ. intermedfat:i.on helps the development process.

Firstly

by the collection of additional savings, secondly by the allocative function,

and thirdly by redistributing the benefits of larger retun,.s on capital

investments.

If a developing country does not hnve ~dequate financial

intermediation; then farmers i.inci others livfng in rural areas do not have
much opportunity to choose between dif.fer.ent forms of saving.

They could

either save in the form of cur~ency or they could honrd gold or other consumer
goods, either as a means of :_:>rote.:t:Lon against inflation or to be certain of

F-~~·[;~-

11 Th-:-Capacity of the Banking System to
--·--_-l_/_S-ee-· .Jacqu:· J,
11
Finance Development , Paper presented to the 5tl::: 'Meeting of Technicians
of ·Central Banks of the Amerkan ContinentJ Bogot~,. 1957. Published in
Proceedings ·of Meetir~gJ0..!::1.m~...lL pp. 169<3L (Also rep::.•inted by Economic
Development Institute of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development).

obtaining the consu:ner gooJs when needed.

·,.:-10~,cver, ::he stock:tn6 of commodities

by a large section of che constLaing public ;,,ithoat adequate storsge facilities

can be very wasteful> as for e:ia:m?le in Ind!.a where h2rvestcd crops are eaten
1/
by rodentsn-'

Therefore, the introduccion of c weP £unctionin8 financial inter-

mediation sy·ster,1 and the deveJ_opwent of
farmer to ean:. int(;;rcst

0:1.

1~0;:iey

and cap:i.tal markets enable the

h:i.o finar,.c:i.al saving~, and bro~dei"~s his choice

between interest be::iring fh1~nd.s1. cl;-1·.'.ms, ::·.,g. 3~1Vin,;o ce:ctif:i.cates, post
office savings c.lepositu_7 gove·c;.1~:!e;.1.t b:,,.,ds o::- J.,1sur.::n:::e pol:1.d.es and physical
assets.
The developrr'.ent

;jf

an eff:i.ciGDt finm:1cial i:1::e.riiiediati oa system is

even more necessary fo;.- the colle:t:to;1 of s;:v:L.1 6 s fr2i,n G3Lc;ried workers in
urban areas.

Wherecs ia:cme:::s .:mci small bt:.s:i.\1essman m;;q h::r;;-~ outlets for

directly in•,es'.::i.ng their sriv:i.ng:; .for 5:mpraviu.-:; i~t1Ed.:~ £r.::-,.,s ,)r snterprises,
the salaried workers do not have compa1·able oppo::-tunit:i.e:s for :i.nvestment.
To the extent that the rate of ret1.~ra on finn,:icicl c:.i.o.::_ms is :.:;rente-::- than
holding physical ,'1SS3ts, the pote..1.tiai small s:1ver -;,.;::ll be in<luced to increase
not only his supply of fin.:rnd.al :vwir:gs but nlso the tot2l supply.

'Ihe

supply of savings is sorr..3tirnes also J.ncr2c1·,ud ]-,ec'"!usc. fL:1,"iEc ial ~.ntermediaries
provide the holder of th;:; £irn., 1cial c 1.2.im ,,ith ,,io::e sc,£;.:ty and marketability
0

than if the saver hB :1 c1ireci:ly 1.ent: to the: 1..~~)rrcwe,~.
intermeciiar:i.es perfc,'.".·m

user.

I:!

In th.fa ,,,ay the. financial

useful role bet~-;cc1°. th.s J.srn:!er .:,f fm::ds c1nd the final

In other words_, the widen:i.ng of savinf opportrm:l.tics a::d a more preferred

l/... -f
- _h____ - '
.!:':Co essor dug
?at::·ic.< ;_,scs tl-lis point ;:o nt,:e3s the n<:C?ed for financial
intermediatioue
-

package of yield, risk and liquidity could increase the saving rateo
Secondly, an efficient financial intermediation system not only
improves the collection of savings, but it is able to select more rationally
between competing uses of the funds,

As investment decisions become more

complex, this allocative function of savings~ mortgage, and development banks
is increaslng in importance.

Even for the developed com1tries, it has been

said that "on the one hand, the social orgin of sr:ve:-s is chan2;:f.ng.

Saving

is becoming a mass rhenomenon and the new categories of savc:rs begin by
using the most simr,le instrument_, Le., depos:i.tn,

un

the other hand, the

financial system is ~dapting it,P.lf to this change by offering more remunerative
investments which, aL th8 same time_, still h,we the feature of simplicity and
liquidity which the gcne:rai public looks for: "1/
Thirdly_, the social d:Lstri.bution of savings achieves a redistribution
of wealth because the people who di.cl not receive any return on savings, when
it was in the form of goods o:-:· currency, are now able to shar<:: in the return

on investments by obtaining 1.nterest or dividends; if the funds are invested
with mutual funds.

Generally s:Jeak.:Lng, .::ny policy which would in.crease total savi11gs

would also he.lp to :'..ncx·,:!Ase financia]. savings, exce:::•t in socialist economies.
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A report of the International Chamber of Commerce-

cites five :n:r:-re.quis::t:es

for the elimination of obstacles to increasing savings in LDCrs,

1) An

increase in income level, 2) the stabilization of the currency, 3) betterment
of the savings climate, 4) improvement of the investment climate, and 5)
provision of the necessary legal framework, giving recognition and protection
of private property.
In some countries such as Burma, Ghana, and Nigeria whe~e marketing
boards or export taxes have been an important source of large 9ublic sector
savings, the governments may feel that the need to stimulate p,:ivate sector
savings is not as urgent as in other developing countries"

Ne:verthelcss;

govE:rnment savings in these countries have fluctuated hith ths r,::=J.ces of
the agricultural commodities in question£/ and .. -judgi.ig by th,:, poo::: :>:vest~
ment performance of at least two countries, Burma and Ghan.'."., -,-th-j old 2d:1ge
of "easy come easy go" may have had an influence on the choi,::c cf 1mprcd1.::.cti.v2
government projects.

During the six year-period 1959/60 to 1-JGt',/65, th~

surplus on current account of marketing boards in Burma fj_n::mce<'l from c::,:::,third to one-half of government sector investments, which themselves c.verr::;_;cd
about 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product; current budget surp1.•.1c12.s provided
about only 20 percent of the funds needed and the balance was fi.:J.anced by
.
1oans .·3/
f oreign

1/ .

.

- Internat,.onal Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Int,::.~:-i-:..:1t:.c~ial Investments and Economic Development, Mobilization of Domest:i.c Savi.2_-:,s_iry Developing
Cou,r~~§. (Paris, 1967), pp,. 9, lOo

II i.?or example, see Gerald K, Helleiner; "The Fiscal Rok of the Marketing
Boards in Nigerian Economic Development, 1947-61 11 in The Econo,nj_c~ 30·1~1!.:tL_
September, 1964.
]_/ See Ministry of National Planning,

l 960~ l 96i:.

A!2™1

A~noir.is_§u:;_·veys ofj3u:rrr..o.,
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One way of approaching the problem of increasing financial savings
is to relate it to the demand for and supply of financial instruments.
Potential savers are those who will be demanding financial instruments,
and it is the financial intermediaries and governments, mainly, and to a
lesser extent business enterprises who will be supplying financial instruments.
They supply of currency, government bonds and treasury bills are
fairly elastic in LDC's because governments are invariably calling upon
central banks to finance their development expenditures and government
securities are usually available on tap.

The supply of savings accounts or

other certificates of ownership deposits are available without limit from
savings banks and commercial banks in areas where they operate.

The supply

of stocks and bonds issued by business enterprises, however, is more limited,
determined in part by possibilities for investment, in part by the willingness
of the entrepreneurs to share the profits of worthwhile ventures with the
public at large, and in part by how easily they can secure other sources of
finance, for e~arnple, loans for banks.
On the demand side of financial instruments, the biggest constraint
is that of the budget and to a lesser extent, considerations of knowledge,
availability, profitability, liquidity, safety and protection against such
uncertainties as inflation, nationalization, etc"

An exception to this

rule is perhaps the demand for currency as a financial instrument which is
dictated as much by considerations of liquidity and inflation as by budget
considerations.

But even here, it is only persons with more than a certain

minium level of income who would be willing to save in the form of high

